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REPRESENTING ACTIONS: LAWS, OBSERVATIONS 
AND HYPOTHESES 
CHITI"A BARAL, M ICHAEL  GELFOND,  AND ALESSANDRO PROVETr I  
I> We propose a modification -~1 of the action description language ~¢. The 
language -~1 allows representation of hypothetical situations and hypo- 
thetical occurrence of actions (as in ~') as well as representation f actual 
occurrences of actions and observations of the truth values of fluents in 
actual situations. The corresponding entailment relation formalizes various 
types of common-sense reasoning about actions and their effects not 
modeled by previous approaches. As an application of Sal we also present 
an architecture for intelligent agents capable of observing, planning and 
acting in a changing environment based on the entailment relation of 
-~1 and use logic programming approximation of this entailment to imple- 
ment a planning module for this architecture. We prove the soundness of 
our implementation and give a sufficient condition for its completeness. 
© Elsevier Science Inc., 1997 <~ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To perform nontrivial reasoning an intelligent agent situated in a changing domain 
needs the knowledge of causal aws that describe ffects of actions that change the 
domain, and the ability to observe and record occurrences of these actions and the 
truth values of fluents (by fluents in this paper we mean propositions whose truth 
values depend on time) at particular moments of time. One of the central problems 
of knowledge representation is the discovery of methods of representing this kind 
of information in a form allowing various types of reasoning about the dynamic 
world and at the same time tolerant o future updates. 
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There are numerous attempts at finding solutions to this problem (for recent 
developments see for instance the special issue of the Journal of Logic and 
Computation [Geo94] and the workshop proceedings [Wor95]). These attempts are 
primarily concerned with finding mathematical models describing effects of actions, 
designing languages and entailment relations suitable for axiomatization of these 
models and discovering inference mechanisms capable of (efficiently) drawing 
inferences from these axioms. Most of the recent efforts seem to be directed at the 
development of methodologies for building provably correct systems capable of 
reasoning about actions. 
In this paper we continue the work started in [GL92] where the authors 
introduced the high-level action description language d capable of expressing causal 
laws which describe effects of actions as well as statements about values of fluents 
in possible states of the world. The entailment relation of the language models 
hypothetical reasoning similar to that of situation calculus [McC63, MH69]. In the 
last few years the syntax and semantics of d were expanded to allow descriptions 
of the effects of concurrent and non-deterministic a tions as well as descriptions of 
global constraints expressing time-independent relations between fluents [BG93, 
KL94, BT94, Bar95, GL95, BT94, HT93, MT95]. 
This work can be viewed as complementary to the alternative approach based on 
direct axiomatizations of theories of actions in classical ogic and its nonmonotonic 
extensions [PR93, Pin94, Rei91, LS91, MS94, Pro96]. We believe that both ap- 
proaches hould be developed further before serious comparison between them 
could become possible. However we briefly mention several attractive features 
shared by action description languages. They have simple and restrictive syntax 
which gives an advantage to the specifier similar to the advantage in using Pascal 
over PL /1  or RISC languages over the assembly language of IBM 360. Their 
semantics is based on the notion of automaton, which provides additional insight 
into the behavior of the corresponding dynamic system. Finally, most of these 
languages do not commit to any specific set of logical connectives which we believe 
is advantageous in certain situations (see, for instance, [MT95, Bar95]). 
In this paper we improve d by expanding its ontology with actual situations 
interpreted as sequences of actions describing the actual evolution of the system 
(as opposed to the hypothetical situations of ~¢). Consequently the new language 
~1 is capable of expressing actual situations and their temporal ordering, and 
observations of both the truth values of the fluents and the actual occurrences of 
actions in these situations. The corresponding entailment relation of -~1 formalizes 
various types of common-sense reasoning about actions and their effects not 
modeled by previous approaches. 
To clarify our motivation let us consider the following simple example) 
Suppose that we are given the following story: 2 
John needs to bring his packed suitcase to the airport. John knows that if he has-a-car 
then by doing the action drive-to-the-airport hewill be at-the-airport and not at-his- 
home. Similarly, if the action hit-car occurs then he will not have-a-car, if the action 
rent-a-car occurs then he will have-a-car, and if the action pack occurs when he is 
at-his-home he will have his suitcase packed. John also knows that he is at-his-home, 
J This example isin the spirit of the Glasgow-London-Moscow problem [McC]. 
2 The italicized terms in this story correspond toactions and fluents and are used in Example 1. 
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and therefore not at-the-airport and he has a car. The plan of packing the suitcase 
and driving to the airport is adequate to achieve John's goal. He then follows his plan 
and starts packing his suitcase. But right after packing he observes his car being hit. 
Following the rest of his original plan, he will no longer achieve his goal. Instead the 
plan of first performing rent-a-car and then performing drive-to-the-airport would be 
adequate. 
Our longstanding oal is to learn how to design and implement programs 
capable of simulating the types of behavior exhibited by John in the above story. As 
a first step we would like to have a mathematical theory to help us to write this and 
similar programs. We believe that the language -~1 and the corresponding entail- 
ment relation form an important part of such a theory. They allow us to precisely 
describe effects of actions available to John as well as the results of John's 
observations, and to characterize the set of valid conclusions about the past, 
current and future states of the world which can reasonably be made by John on 
the basis of his knowledge. 
This is of course not enough. To succeed in designing a program simulating 
John's behavior, we need to better understand its dynamics. In particular, a good 
theory should suggest a program architecture--a possible way of decomposing the 
problem into simpler independent modules responsible for different intellectual 
tasks such as planning from the current situation and updating the current domain 
description by new observations. Finally, we should develop a methodology of 
implementing these modules according to the specification. 
The first six sections of this paper are devoted to description of the syntax and 
semantics of -~1 and its entailment relation, as well as an application of this 
entailment o the design of an architecture for intelligent agents capable of 
observing, planning and acting in a changing environment. We start with the 
description of a language -~0 capable of expressing eneral aws governing effects 
of actions together with observations of values of fluents and occurrences of 
actions in particular situations. In Section 5 we extend .Z~ 0 to ~1 by allowing 
hypothetical reasoning. 
It is probably worth noting that 21 is not an extension of ~¢. We believe that 
allowing hypothetical statements of the form "fluent f would be true after the 
execution of a sequence a of actions" in domain descriptions of ~ is unnecessary 
and (in the presence of actual situations and facts) leads to certain complications 
(see Section 5 and Appendix A for a discussion on this aspect). In -~1 we limit the 
use of hypothetical statements to queries. Domain descriptions of 5'~1 can only 
contain causal laws describing effects of actions, and facts but not hypotheses. 
These restrictions lead to clearer ontology and semantics of the language. 
Section 7 addresses the question of computing the entailment relation of -~1 
w.r.t, domain descriptions generated according to our architecture. First, we follow 
the basic idea of [GL92] and translate such domain descriptions into (declarative) 
logic programs. Some sufficient conditions on the type of a domain description D 
guarantee soundness (and sometimes completeness) of the translation lq D (this 
adds to the list of translations from domain descriptions of action description 
languages with different ontologies into disjunctive, abductive and equational logic 
programs [Dun93, DDS93, HT93, Tur94, ALP94]). 
To be able to actually answer queries to 17 D we need to use a particular query 
answering algorithm. The standard Prolog interpreter (as implemented--for in- 
stance--in Quintus Prolog) is certainly the most popular among the large family of 
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such algorithms [CSW95, ADP94] and seems to be a natural choice for use in this 
paper. Consequently, we view II o as a Prolog program and prove soundness and 
completeness of the Prolog inference mechanism w.r.t, the answer set semantics 3 
[GL91] of l i D. 
In the last part of the paper, we discuss an implementation of the planning 
module of the proposed system. This module consists of a procedural part that 
generates candidate plans and a declarative description of the domain description 
D, represented by its translation I io,  which is used for testing. The planner is 
simple, has a clear declarative specification and is proven correct w.r.t, this 
specification. The planner can be used in changing domains. It allows (on-line) 
introduction of new objects in the domain (such as the appearing of a new block at 
the table in the blocks world), as well as addition of new information about values 
of fluents and occurrences of actions, It is nonmonotonic, i.e., capable of creating 
new plans when new observations invalidate the old plans. Even though there are 
reports in the literature about planners combining one or more of these features 
[We194, KKY95, Ped88] we are not aware of a system which contains all of them. 
Moreover, inclusion of these features in our framework does not require any 
special effort. Even though the main purpose of building the planner was clarity 
and provable correctness, its efficiency is not as bad as we expected. For the 
domains from [We194] that we tested, our planner performed better for the 
particular queries and initial states that we considered. 4 
We believe that developing action specification languages and approximating 
their entailment relation in logic programming contributes to better understanding 
of the underlying ontological principles of reasoning about actions as well as the 
advantages and limitations of logic programming languages as tools for implement- 
ing such reasoning. It already allowed to establish equivalence of some of the 
previously known theories of actions seemingly based on different intuitions, 
languages and logics [Kar93, Kar94] and stimulated work on the theory and 
implementation of logic programming languages [AB91, Tur93, MT94, LT94, 
LMT93]. 
From the software ngineering standpoint, heories of actions can be interesting 
as a testbed for building provably-correct lasses of logic programs from rather 
abstract specifications. Our work contributes to better understanding of this 
process. 
Finally, we hope that the development of planners based on general theories of 
actions will contribute to establishing closer ties between theories of actions, 
planning, and logic programming. 
2. SYNTAX OF "~0 
We will start with the description of a language -~0 capable of expressing eneral 
laws governing effects of actions together with observations of values of fluents and 
occurrences of actions in particular situations. In Section 5 we extend -~0 to _ow 1 to 
allow hypothetical reasoning. 
3 The use of answer set semantics i not essential. For H o it coincides with the well-founded 
[VGRS91] and some of the other semantics. To make the paper self-contained, definition of the answer 
set semantics is given in Appendix B. 
4 We are currently in the process of doing extensive t sting by randomly generating the queries and 
initial states. 
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The alphabet of  .ZF 0 consists of  three disjoint nonempty sets of symbols J,, .a¢ 
and ~,  cal led fluents, actions, and actual situations. Elements  of 5g and S p will be 
denoted by (possibly indexed) letters a and s respectively. We will also assume that 
S ~ contains two special s ituations s o and s N cal led initial and current situations. 
A fluent literal is a fluent possibly preceded by negat ion 7 .  F luent  l iterals will 
be denoted by (possibly indexed) letters f and p (possibly preceded by --1). ~ -7 f 
will be equated with f .  For  any fluent f ,  _~ l f=f ,  and f= ~f .  We denote 
sequences 5 of actions by the Greek  letter a and its indexed versions. For  an action 
a, a o a, means the sequence of actions where a follows a.  We also sometimes 
denote sequence of actions with the standard Prolog notat ion for lists. For  
example,  the list of  actions [a 1, az , . . . ,  an], denotes the sequence of actions where 
a 1 is fol lowed by a a and so on up to a n. 
There are two kinds of proposi t ions in -~0 cal led causal (or effect) laws and 
facts: 
• A causal aw is an expression of the form 
a causes f if Pl  . . . . .  Pn, (1) 
where a is an action, and f ,  Pl . . . . .  Pn (n > O) are fluent literals. Pl , ' ' ' ,Pn 
are cal led preconditions of (1). We will read this law as " f  is guaranteed to 
be true after the execution of  an action a in any state of the world in which 
P l , ' " ,Pn  are true. ''6 
If n = 0, we write the effect law simply as "a causes f . "  Two casual laws of 
the form a causes f if P l  . . . . .  Pn and a causes ~ f if ql . . . . .  q,, are said to 
be contradictory if {Pl . . . . .  Pn} (~ {q-~l . . . . .  ~ = Q. 
• An  atomic fluent fact is an expression of the form 
f at s, (2) 
where f is a fluent l iteral and s is a situation. The intuitive reading of (2) is 
" f  is observed to be true in situation s." 
• An  atomic occurrence fact is an expression of the form 
a occurs_at s, (3) 
where a is a sequence of  actions, and s is a situation. It states that "the 
sequence ot of  actions was observed to have occurred in situation s"  (we 
assume that actions in the sequence follow each other  immediately).  
• An  atomic precedence fact is an expression of  the form 
s 1 precedes 2, (4) 
where s I and s 2 are situations. It states that situation s 2 occurred after 
s ituation s r 
Proposit ions of  the type (1) express general  knowledge about effects of  actions 
and hence are referred to as laws. Proposit ions (2), (3), and (4) are called atomic 
facts or observations. A fact is a proposit ional  combinat ion of  atomic facts. 
5 In this paper by sequence we always mean a finite sequence. 
6 The use of the word causes may be somewhat misleading, since f may_have been true even before 
the action a was executed. To justify the name we probably should require f to be included in the list of 
preconditions of (1). To avoid notational confusion with .~' we prefer, however, to keep the name. 
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A collection of laws and facts is called a domain description of -~o. The sets of 
laws and facts of a domain description D will be denoted by D l and Df respec- 
tively. We will only consider domain descriptions whose propositions do not 
mention the situation constant sN. 
To see how the domain descriptions of ~0 can be used to represent knowledge 
about actions let us consider the following example: 
Example 2.1. Suppose that we are given a series of observations about Fred: 
(a) When the water pistol was squirted Fred was seen to be alive and dry and 
(b) in a later moment a shot was fired at Fred. 
Suppose also that it is generally known that 
(c) squirting makes Fred wet and 
(d) shooting makes Fred dead. 
The above information can be represented by a domain description D 1 consisting 
of the following propositions: 
' Facts: 
(P l )  
(p2) 
(P3)  
(P4)  
Laws: 
(P6)  
(P7) 
O 1 = 
alive at s o 
dry at s o 
squirt occurs_at  s o 
s o precedes  sl 
shoot occurs_at  s 
squirt causes  ~ dry 
shoot causes  ~ alive 
To complete the description of D 1 we need to define its language. For simplicity 
we assume that this language contains only the fluents, actions and actual situa- 
tions mentioned in the propositions of D~ together with the situation s N. Unless 
stated otherwise, the same assumption will be made in other examples throughout 
this paper. 
Domain descriptions in .9~0 are used in conjunction with the following informal 
assumptions which clarify the description's meaning: 
(a) changes in the values of fluents can only be caused by execution of actions; 
(b) there are no actions except hose from the language of the domain descrip- 
tion; 
(c) there are no effects of actions except hose specified by the causal laws of 
the domain; 
(d) no actions occur except those needed to explain the facts in the domain 
description; and 
(e) actions do not overlap or happen simultaneously. 
These assumptions give a reasonably good intuitive understanding of domain 
descriptions of .S¢ 0. 
Consider for instance domain description D~ from Example 1. It is easy to see 
that D~ together with assumption (d) implies that squirt is the only action which 
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occurs between s o and s 1 and that shoot is the only action which occurs between 
s I and s N. Using D 1 with the assumptions (a)-(e) we can conclude that at moment 
s 1 Fred is wet but alive while at moment SN, i.e., at the end of the story, he is wet 
and dead. 
Our goal in this paper is to build a mathematical model which will help us to 
better understand and eventually mechanize these types of arguments. As the first 
step we suggest a semantics of domain descriptions of -~0 which precisely specifies 
the sets of acceptable conclusions which can be reached from such descriptions and 
assumptions (a)-(e). Domain descriptions under this semantics are also intended 
for use by system designers as a formal specification language. 
3. SEMANTICS OF -~0 
In this section we introduce a semantics of our action description language ~0. We 
assume that states of the world are determined by sets of fluents and that actions 
executed in a particular state can add and remove such fluents according to the 
causal laws. The set of all possible behaviors of a dynamic system, satisfying causal 
laws of a given domain description D, can then be described by a transition 
diagram with states labeled by sets of fluents and transitions labeled by actions. To 
interpret he facts from D we need to select the initial situation together with a 
path in the diagram describing the actual behavior of the system. In the following 
definition the idea is formalized in a somewhat non-standard way. Instead of 
defining a transition function and an initial state, we describe the automaton by a 
partial function from action sequences to states. We prefer this slightly more 
complex definition because of its appropriateness for expanded omains that may 
contain nondeterministic actions [KL94], triggers, temporal facts, etc. To make the 
idea precise, we need to introduce some terminology. 
Let a state be a set of fluents. A causal interpretation is a partial function 
from sequences of actions to states such that: 
1. The empty sequence [ ] belongs to the domain of • and 
2. ~ is prefix-closed. 7 
• ([ ]) is called the initial state of ~.  The partial function • serves as an 
interpretation of the causal laws of D. 
Given a fuent  f and a state ~r, we say that f holds in tr ( f  is true in tr) if 
f~t r ;  ~fho lds  in o- ( f  is false in tr) if f~t r .  The truth of a propositional 
combination of fluents with respect o tr is defined as usual. 
Now we define effects of actions determined by causal laws of a domain 
description D and our informal assumptions. A fluent literal f is an (immediate) 
effect of (executing) a in o- if there is an effect law a causes f if Pl . . . . .  Pn in D 
whose preconditions Pl , . . . ,Pn hold in tr. Let us define the following sets of 
fluents. 
E+(o  ") = { f : f~3-and  f is an effect of a in tr}; 
Ea(o -  ) = { f : f~ J rand  ~f  is an effect of a in tr} and 
Res(a, ~r) = (o 'UE+(o ' ) )  \ E~-(o-), 
7 By "pref ix closed" we mean that for any sequence of actions a and action a, if ~ o a is in the 
domain  of * then so is a.  
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where Res is referred to as the transition function. Definition 1 below captures the 
meaning of causal laws of D. 
Definition 3.1. A causal interpretation q? satisfies the causal laws of D if for any 
sequence o~ o a from the language of D, 
=fRes(A '~(a) )  i fE~(qr (o t ) )nEA(qt (a ) )=O,  
° Z)  
undefined otherwise. 
We say • is a causal model of D if it satisfies the causal laws of D. 
It is easy to see that causal models of domain descriptions are uniquely 
determined by their initial values, i.e., for any causal models ~'t 1 and ~2 of a 
domain description D, if a'IYl( [ ] )=  %(  [ ]) then XI? 1 = XI? 2 . Imt  us illustrate the 
notion of causal model by the following example. 
Example 3.1. Consider domain description D 1 from Example 2.1. The transition 
diagram in Figure 1 corresponds to causal laws of D r It is easy to check that 
function Res defined by D 1 is the transition function of this diagram and that a 
function • is a causal model of D 1 iff 
~'([  ]) = 
for some state o- of the diagram and for any sequence a of actions and any action 
a from D 1 
~(  a o a) = Res( a, qt( a ) ). 
Example 3.2. Consider a domain description consisting of the following proposi- 
tions: 
a causes  f 
a causes  ~ f .  
It is easy to see that for any causal model • of this domain description, ~(a)  is 
undefined for any nonempty a, since for every o-, E~+(er)= E~-(tr)= {f}. 
squirt 
s h o o ~  squirt 
shoot 
shoot 
squirt 
FIGURE 1. The states through 
which D 1 can evolve. 
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To continue our definition of the semantics of -~0, consider an arbitrary domain 
description D and let • be a causal model of D. To interpret he observations of 
D we first need to define the meaning of situations in 5 °. To do so, we consider a 
mapping E from 5 ~' to sequences of actions from the language of D. This mapping 
will be called a situation assignment of ~ if it satisfies the following properties. 
1. ~(s0)  = [ ]; 
2. for every s ~S p, Z(s) is a prefix of "L(SN). 
Definition 3.2. An interpretation M of -~0 is a pair (~ ,  Z), where • is a causal 
model of D, Z is a situation assignment of S Q and E(SN) belongs to the domain 
of ~.  
E(s N) will be called the actual path of M and for simplicity will often be 
denoted by ZN. Now, we can define truth of facts of D w.r.t, an interpretation M. 
Facts which are not true in M will be called false in M. 
Definition 3.3. For any interpretation M = (~,  Z) 
1. ( f  at s) is true in M (or satisfied by M)  if f is true in ~(E(s)) ;  
2. (at occurs_at  s) is true in M if the sequence Z(s)o at is a prefix of the actual 
path ~N of M; 
3. (s I precedes 2) is true in M if Z(s 1) is a proper prefix of Z(s2); 
4. truth of non-atomic facts in M is defined as usual. 
A set of facts is true in an interpretation M if all its members are true in M. 
To complete the definition of model we need only to formalize the following 
underlying assumption of domain descriptions of -~0: 
(d) No actions occur except those needed to explain the facts in the domain 
description. 
This is done by imposing a minimality condition on the situation assignment of S p 
which leads to the following definition. 
Definition 3.4. An interpretation M- - - (~,  E) will be called a model of a domain 
description D in .2a0 if the following conditions are satisfied: 
1. • is a causal model of D; 
2. facts of D are true in M and 
3. there is no other interpretation M '= (~,Z ' )  such that M' satisfies condi- 
tions 1) and 2) above and Z~v is a subsequence 8 of EN. 
A domain description D is said to be consistent if it has a model. 
Notice that to prove that D is consistent it suffices to find an interpretation M
of D satisfying the first two conditions of Definition 4. Existence of the model will 
follow from the finiteness of EN. 
8 Given a sequence X =x 1 .... ,xm, another sequence Z = zl,... , z n is a subsequence of X is there 
exists a strictly increasing sequence il,... ,i n of indices of X such that for all j = 1,2...,n, we have 
Xij = Zj. 
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In Definition 4, while minimizing the occurrences of actions we were comparing 
models with same initial state. This is reflected in condition 3 above. An alternative 
definition may be obtained by replacing condition 3 by the following: 
3'. There is no other interpretation M '= (~ ' ,E ' )  such that M satisfies the 
conditions 1. and 2. and E~v is a subsequence of YN" 
If the second definition is used, minimization of occurrences of actions is done 
regardless of the possible initial situations. In this paper we prefer the first 
definition as we would like to give equal preference to all the possible initial 
situations, and minimize occurrences of actions only locally with respect o particu- 
lar initial situations. 
The query language associated with -~0 will consist of all ~0 facts, and be 
denoted by _~a. The following definition describes the set of acceptable conclu- 
sions one can obtain from a domain description D. 
Definition 3.5. A domain description D entails a query q (written as D ~ q) iff q is 
true in all models of D. The set of all facts entailed by D will be denoted by 
Cn( D ). 
We will say that the answer given by D to a query q is 
yes if D ~ q; 
no i fD~ ~q;  
unknown otherwise. 
The next section is devoted to an analysis of -~0 formalizations of several 
examples of reasoning about actions from the literature. 
4. EXAMPLES 
In this section we illustrate by way of examples how domain descriptions are used 
to represent information and how the above notion of entailment captures infor- 
mal arguments based on the information from these descriptions and the informal 
assumptions (a)-(e). 
Let us use domain description D 1 from Example 1 to demonstrate how the 
entailment relation of 5¢ 0 can model simple temporal projection. 
Proposition 4.1. Domain description D 1 has a unique model and 9 
D 1 ~ (( -~ dry/x -~ alive) at SN) 
01 ~ (( ~ dry/k alive) at Sx). 
PROOF. Consider the causal interpretation q~: 
* ( [  ]) = {alive,dry} 
{alive} if alive ~ qr( a ) 
~(  oe o squirt) = Q otherwise 
9 In this paper we will use fl A .-. /xfn at S as an abbreviation for (fl at S) A .-. A (fn at S). 
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1Ir( (Y 0 shoot) = 
(dq} if &E*(a) 
0 otherwise 
C( s,) = [squirt] 
S(SN) = [squirt,shoot]. 
It is easy to check that the interpretation M = (q, C) satisfies Definition 4 and 
hence is a model of D,. 
Let us show that M is the only model, i.e., for any model M, = (qI, C,) of D,, 
q = q,, and I: = C,. Since by definition any situation assignment maps sO into [ 1, 
statements (~1) and (~2) of D, will be satisfied only if W[ 1) = ‘P1([ ]> = (alive, dly}. 
Since q and 9i are causal models of D, and causal models are uniquely 
determined by their initial values, we have that 1I’ = ql. 
To establish that C = X1, notice that to satisfy the conditions (p3)-(p5) the 
actual path Z,(sN) of M, must start with squirt followed (not necessarily immedi- 
ately) by shoot. But then C(s,> is a subsequence of C,(s, ). M, is a model of D, 
and hence C, satisfies the minimality condition 3 from Definition 4. This implies 
that X(sN) = Z,(sN) = [squirt, shoot]. Now recall that, by definition of situation 
assignment, C,(s,) must be a prefix of [squirt, shoot]. Since (pj) and (ps) are true 
in M, we have that Xsl) = C,(s,) = [squirt]. 
To complete the proof it suffices to notice that (( 7 dly A 7 alive) at sN) and 
(( 7 dly A alive) at sl) are true in M. 
Example 4.1. (Reasoning by cases>. Let us consider a modification of Example 2.1 
where there is a precondition of being loaded for the shoot action to be deadly and 
where there are two guns at least one of which is initially loaded. 
‘Facts : 
(41) 
(q2) 
D, = i (%I 
Laws : 
(q4) 
\ (qs) 
alive at sO 
loaded, at sO V loaded, at sO 
[shoot,, shoot,] occurs-at s,) 
shoot, causes 7 alive if loaded, 
shoot, causes 7 alive if loaded, 
Proposition 4.2. Domain description D, is consistent and 
D, k 7 alive at s,,, . 
PROOF. Let M = (U, C> be a model of D,. Then, by definition of causal model, we 
have that ? satisfies the following conditions c> 
*(a 0 shoot,) = 
*(a) \ (alive} if loaded, E W( a), 
*(a) otherwise, 
*(a 0 shoot,) = 
q( CX) \ {alive) if loaded, E *(a), 
T(a) otherwise. 
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Since M is a model, Rt(E(s0)) must satisfy facts ql and q2, i.e., 
• ([ ]) = {alive, loaded,} 
or  
o r  
• ([ ]) = {alive, loaded2} 
• ([ ]) = {alive, loaded,, loaded2}. 
To satisfy q3, E(N)  must start with [shoot,, shoot 2 ] and hence, from the minimality 
condition, we have that 
( sN ) = [ shoot,, shoot2 ]. 
By examining each possible initial situation it is easy to check that ~tt(~(SN )) 
satisfies --1 alive at s u. 
Similar argument shows that (~0, E0) where ~0 is defined by initial condition 
• ([ ])={alive, loaded 1} and by condition (*), and £(s0)=[  ] and Z(SN)= 
[shOOtl,Shoot 2] satisfies conditions 1. and 2. of Definition 3.4 and hence D 2 is 
consistent. [] 
Example 4.2 (Explaining observations). Let us now consider a modified version of 
Example 1 where instead of 
(b) "In a later moment a shot was fired at Fred" 
we have 
(b')  "In a later moment Fred was observed to be dead." 
The new scenario can be represented by a domain description D 3. 
0 3 
' Facts: 
(p , )  alive at s o 
(P2) dry at s o 
(P3) squirt occurs_at so 
(P4) So precedes , 
(Ps) ~ alive at s, 
Laws: 
(P6) squirt causes ~ dry 
(P7) shoot causes ~ alive 
Using arguments imilar to those above we can prove the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.3. Domain description D 3 is consistent and 
D 3 ~ [squirt, shoot] occurs_at s0. 
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5. FROM DOMAIN DESCRIPTIONS TO HYPOTHETICAL REASONING 
Even though domain descriptions in -~0 can express types of knowledge and 
reasoning not easily expressible in other variants of ~,  they lack the ability of the 
latter to do hypothetical reasoning. Even the simple original version of o~ allows 
propositions of the form 
f after a 1 . . . . .  a m- (1) 
In ~¢" such statements can be understood in several different ways. Sometimes they 
are viewed as observations and read as " f / s  true after the execution of the 
sequence of actions [a l , . . . ,am]."  We believe that such a reading is misleading. 
Indeed, consider a domain description D containing statements f after a 1 and g 
after a 2. Since the ontology of ~¢ does not allow concurrent actions it is impossible 
to observe both a 1 and a 2 occurring at s 0. Therefore if the above statements are 
viewed as facts, the domain description D should be characterized as inconsistent, 
which of course is not the case in ~.  It is probably better to understand (1) as 
saying that a I . . . .  , a m can be executed in the initial situation, and if it were, then f 
would be true afterwards. This reading allows the use of such statements for 
querying domain descriptions about possible outcomes of actions. 
If we want to allow statements of the form (1) in domain descriptions of our 
language we should understand them as hypothetical or even counterfactual. Since 
we want to find a language containing only those constructs which are absolutely 
necessary for reasoning about actions and their effects and since we want to 
preserve the reading of domain descriptions as theories containing only actual 
knowledge about the domain, we limit ourselves to using hypotheses in queries but not 
in the domain descriptions. However, in Appendix A we will discuss how this 
restriction could be lifted. 
Meanwhile, let us go to precise definitions, and start by introducing propositions 
of the form 
f after [a 1 . . . . .  a , ]  at s (2) 
called hypotheses, which slightly generalizes the syntax of (1). They are read as 
"sequence a l , . . . ,  a m of actions can be executed in the situation s, and if it were, 
then fluent literal f would be true afterwards." 
If s in (2) is the current situation, i.e., s N, then we simply write 
f after [a 1 . . . . .  a . ] .  (3) 
If n in (3) is 0, then we write 
currently f .  (4) 
The language -~1 is obtained from -~0 by allowing statements of the forms (2), (3) 
and (4). By definition, domain descriptions of .~  coincide with those of -~0 and its 
queries are propositional formulas constructed from atomic facts of .2~0 and 
hypotheses. Observe that--according to these definitions--the query language of 
5'~1 is strictly stronger than that of ~f while, as a means of specifying domain 
descriptions, neither -~  nor oQ¢ is more powerful. 
Now we will define the semantics of .~ .  The notions of model of a domain 
description of .ZFa and of the truth of atomic facts in such models remain 
unchanged. To define answers to queries from -Yl we need the following: 
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Definition 5.1. Let D be a domain description in ~ and M= (~,~)  be an 
interpretation of D. We say that a hypothesis (2) is true in an interpretation M if f 
is true in ~(E(s )o [a  I . . . . .  a,]). 
Truth of arbitrary queries and sets of queries in ~ is defined as usual. 
A reasoner with knowledge formulated in a domain description D can use 
hypothetical queries for various purposes. Probably, the most important of them is 
planning. Suppose that our reasoning agent is given a domain description D and a 
collection of fluent literals G viewed as a goal to be achieved by performing 
actions from D. Hypothetical statements of ~1 and the entailment relation of 
can be used to define a notion of a plan: 
Definition 5.2. Let D be a domain description in .~  and G be a set of fluent 
literals. A sequence a of actions is a plan for achieving a goal G if D ~f  after 
for every fluent literal fE  G. 
A good planning program should be able to generate sequences of actions 
viewed as possible plans and test them using the entailment relation of ~ .  
Consider for instance the following example. 
Example 5.1 (Planning). Given the domain description D 4 described below 
~ Facts :
( f l )  alive at s o 
D4= Laws: 
(11) shoot causes ~ alive if loaded 
( l 2 ) load causes loaded 
and a goal G = { --, alive}, a reasoner can come up with a candidate plan [load, shoot] 
for achieving this goal. The candidate plan will be tested by proving a (hypotheti- 
cal) statement "~ alive after [load, shoot]," i.e., by checking whether D 4 ~ -7 alive 
after [load, shoot]. It is easy to check that the statement is true and therefore 
[load,shoot] is indeed a plan for G. Notice that if the plan is carried out in the 
absence of outside interference, the resulting domain description (obtained from 
D 4 by adding [load, shoot] occursat  s 0) entails G at s u. Otherwise (i.e., in the 
presence of outside interference) the plan may be invalidated and the reasoner will 
be forced to continue planning from the (new) current situation. Such a replanning 
will be discussed in the next section. 
The previous example illustrates hypothetical reasoning about the future. In the 
following example we demonstrate how to perform hypothetical reasoning by using 
assumptions about the past. 
Example 5.2. Consider the domain description D 4 and notice that it contains no 
information on the gun being loaded in the initial situation. Suppose now, that, 
given the domain description D4, a reasoner would like to know if Fred would be 
dead after shooting under the assumption that initially the gun is loaded. This can 
naturally be represented by the query 
q, = (loaded at So) D ( ~ alive after [shoot] at So). 
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It is easy to see that D4's answer to ql is yes, which is, of course, the intended 
answer. 
The entailment relation of 21 also allows to model more sophisticated forms of 
hypothetical reasoning. Notice that our translation of the informal question in the 
above example maps the " i f . . . then"  structure of  the question into a material 
implication ~.  This is possible since the premise of ql is possible, i.e., there are 
models of D 4 satisfying the premise. This is not the case in the next example, 
where the query has a form of a counterfactual. 
Example 5.3 (Counterfactuals). Consider a domain description 
'Facts: 
( f l )  
( f2)  
( f3)  
D5 = Laws: 
(12) 
(6) 
alive at s o 
loaded at s o 
unload occurs_at  s o 
shoot causes  --1 alive i f  loaded 
load causes  loaded 
unload causes  ~ loaded 
Given this information the reasoner must be able to conclude that " I f  someone 
used the gun to shoot the turkey at point zero then the turkey would be dead." 
This is an example of a counterfactual statement (no shooting actually occurred at 
the situation s 0) and as such cannot be translated by a material implication. 
It can however be represented in our language as an atomic hypothetical 
statement 
q2 = ~ alive after  shoot at s o. 
It is easy to see that, in accordance with our expectations, D 5 ~ q2. Using the same 
type of translation one can check that the statement " I f  someone used the gun to 
shoot the turkey at point zero it would be alive" is false. 
As it was mentioned above, the counterfactual character of q2 follows from the 
fact that according to D5 no shooting actually occurred at s o and hence q2 is not 
only hypothetical but also contrary to the occurrence fact ( f3))  ° 
Let us now consider a statement " I f  at the initial moment  the gun were not 
loaded and someone used it to shoot the turkey then the turkey would not be 
dead." This is a counterfactual lso, but this time its "if" part is contrary not only 
to the occurrence fact (f3) as in the previous example but also to the fluent fact 
(f2)- It is not difficult to see that intuitively this statement is true in D 5. To 
represent it in our language we need to represent a state of the world which is 
closest to s o and in which the gun is unloaded. It is easy to see that this state 
differs from s o only by the value of fluent loaded and can be achieved by executing 
10 Notice, that though q2 is also expressible in ~ as well as in situation calculus, f3 = unload 
occursat s o is not expressible in either and hence q2 loses its counterfactual character when 
represented in s¢ or in situation calculus. 
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the action unload. Using this idea we can represent the above query as: N 
q3 = alive after  [ unload, shoot ] at s o 
and check that D 5 indeed entails q3. 
These examples, of course, are only meant to illustrate the power of -~1 and its 
entailment relation. A detailed study of hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning 
in -~1 and its extension is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Finally, the following definitions and notations can be useful in our further 
discussions. Let H1 and H 2 be two sets of hypotheses. We say that the premise H~ 
entails conclusion H 2 in D if H 2 is true in every model of D in which H~ is true. 
We will denote this by H~ ~D /42. It is easy to see that the following result holds. 
Proposition 5.1. ~3 ~D H iff D ~ H. 
A set of hypotheses H is inconsistent w.r.t, a domain description D if no model 
of D satisfies H. 
It is important o notice that the entailment relation (~D)  defined by D is 
monotonic--addition f new hypotheses to H~ can only decrease the set of models 
of D satisfying H 1 and hence can only increase the set of conclusions. Nonmono- 
tonicity can occur only when new factual information about the world (i.e., new 
laws or new facts) are added to a reasoner's knowledge. 
6. AN ARCHITECTURE FOR AUTONOMOUS AGENTS 
The ability to express the current situation, record facts and perform hypothetical 
reasoning makes .Z~ 1 a viable candidate for use in designing intelligent agents 
capable of planning and acting in a changing environment. 
In this section we outline a possible approach to such a design. In contrast with 
previous sections, the material covered here will have a somewhat speculative 
character- -we briefly describe several modules comprising the agent control 
program and illustrate the main algorithm through examples. In this we will be 
heavily relying on the reader's intuition. The next sections, however, contain a 
mathematical description of one of these modules together with a provenly correct 
(but domain independent and hence inefficient) Prolog implementation. 
Let us assume that our agent is capable of observing (or otherwise receiving 
from the outside world) the values of fluents and occurrences of actions as well as 
of executing some actions. We also assume that it is maintaining and using its own 
internal model of the world and that it has a collection of (possibly prioritized) 
goals which can be updated dynamically from the outside. The agent's behavior is 
controlled by the following simple loop: 
1. The agent examines the outside world and stores the obtained information in 
its internal model; 
2. the most urgent goals are selected from the set of goals (possibly including 
those obtained in step 1; 
11 In general for any fluent literal f we can introduce an action af and a causal rule af causes f and 
translate a counterfactual of the form "if f were true at s then g would have been true at s" as g after 
af at s. 
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3. the agent constructs a plan to achieve these goals and executes one or more 
actions of this plan. The information about this execution is stored in the 
agent's internal model of the world and the control goes back to the step one. 
The above architecture makes many simplifying assumptions. It assumes, for 
instance, that the time used by the agent for finding a plan and executing an action 
is sufficiently short to avoid disruption, that observations made by the agent are 
always correct, etc. Further research will establish how restrictive these assump- 
tions really are. But even in the presence of these assumptions the task of building 
(or even modeling) our intelligent agent is a difficult one. In particular, to 
mechanize the above control strategy we need (among other things) to have a 
precise, unambiguous language suitable for describing the agent's internal model. 
We believe that -~1 can be successfully used for this purpose. 12 To illustrate this 
point, let us consider again the agent John (from Section 1) trying to achieve his 
goals in a changing environment. 
Example 6.1. Consider the story about John from Section 1. We assume that John 
can execute actions pack, drive, rent and observe the truth values of fluents home, 
at_airport, has_car, and packed and occurrences of the action hit. 
Initially, the internal world model of John contains a description of the effects 
of these actions which can be represented by the following domain description in 
'Laws: 
(ll) rent causes  has_car 
(12) hit causes  -7 has_car 
D8 = (13) drive causes at_airport i f  has_car" 
(14)  drive causes  ~ home i f  has_car 
( l 5) pack causes  packed i f  home 
John's initial observation of values of fluents can be recorded by the following 
collection of facts: 
(facts: 
( f l )  home at  s o 
F0 ( f z ) ~ at_airport at  s o 
/ 
(f3) has_car at  s o 
His goal of bringing a packed suitcase to the airport has the form 
currently (packed A at_airport). 
To find a plan of actions John can use Definition 5.2 from the previous ection, i.e., 
he needs to search for a sequence c~ of actions such that 13 
Jo ~ ( packed A at_airport) after a,  
12 One important feature needed for this purpose which is not available in .Le a is the ability to 
represent and reason about concurrent actions. This restriction is only imposed however to simplify the 
presentation a d can be easily lifted (see [BG93]). 
13 Here and in the rest of the paper we use  fl A "-- Afn after c~ at S as an abbreviation for (fl after 
c~ at S)  A ... A (f~ after a at S). 
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where Jo = D8 U F o. It is easy to check that s N = S O and 
Jo ~ ( packed A at_airport) after ao, 
where a o = [pack, drive]. Satisfied with the plan, John packs his suitcase. The 
execution of this action is recorded by expanding Jo by the new facts 
( f4)  pack occurs_at s 0, 
( fs)  so precedes 1. 
Let us denote the resulting description by J~. All he needs to do now is to execute 
a 1 = [drive]. Suppose however, that only one action can be executed between the 
observations, and therefore John's control goes back to Step 1 in which he observes 
his car being hit by a truck. This event is recorded by expanding J1 by the 
statements 
(f6) hit occurs_at sl, 
( f7) sl precedes 2. 
It is easy to see that for the resulting domain description J2 
J2 ~ currently ~ has_car 
and 
J2 ~e (packed A at_airport) after al 
and hence the plan ax is invalidated by this new information. To revise the plan, 
John poses the query 
? - - (  packed A at_airport) after a 
to J2. It is again easy to check that 
J2 ~ ( packed A at_airport) after az, 
where a 2 = [rent, drive]. 
Suppose now that John goes on to execute a 2 (this time without unpleasant 
interruptions). It is easy to see that the resulting domain description obtained from 
J2 by adding the statements 
(f8) rent occurs_at S 2 
(]'9) sz precedes s 3 
(f10) drive occurs_at s 3 
( f l l )  s3 precedes s 4 
entails John's goal. 
The above discussion suggests that the agent's program can be constructed from 
four modules, observe, selectgoal ,  plan, and execute organized in a simple loop. 
To further clarify our intuition we give a short description of these modules. 
• The module observe consists of two parts: observe_facts and obtain_goals. 
The former is responsible for obtaining new fluent and occurrence facts from 
the outside world and storing them in the agent's internal model D. The 
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latter gets new goals together with their priorities and adds them to the set of 
goals of the agent. The module observe_facts considers the current internal 
model D with current situation s k and performs the following three steps: 
- - I t  calls a submodule observe_f luents(s k) which checks the values of 
observable fluents in s k and expands D by the corresponding fluent facts. 
(Notice that s k remains the current situation of the new internal model.) 
- - I t  then calls a submodule observe_act ion(sk )wh ich  ecks if some action 
occurred at s k. 
- - I f  action a is observed to have occurred at s k then it again expands D by 
the statements 
occurs_at s k and 
s k precedes  k + 1, 
where sk+ 1 is a situation constant not occurring in D. It then again calls 
observe f luents with the parameter sk+ 1. Notice that now s k+l becomes 
the current situation of D. 
• The next module, se lec tgoa l ,  is probably the simplest. It selects the most 
urgent goals from the set of all goals of the agent. 
• The module plan takes the set of fluent literais from the goal g selected in 
the previous tep and searches for a sequence a of actions such that for all f 
in this set, D ~f  after a. If the agent is capable of efficiently testing the 
entailment relation of 5¢~, such an a can be found by simple generate-and- 
test methods. We will call such planners .Lt-planners. Despite their simplicity, 
they have several attractive features which make them an interesting subject 
for investigation. They can be used to compare expressive power and effi- 
ciency of various nonmonotonic formalisms used to do the testing or serve as 
a testbed for developing mathematical methods for proving properties of 
planners, such as correctness and completeness and stability of the produced 
plans in a dynamic world among others. They can also be instrumental in 
evaluating efficiency of various domain dependent heuristics controlling the 
"generate" part of the program, comparing different approaches to planning, 
etc. Some of the points mentioned above will be elaborated upon in the next 
two sections. 
• Finally, the module execute consists of the (possibly) complex part responsi- 
ble for physical execution of an action a and a simple "bookkeeping" part 
which expands the internal model D of the agent by the two statements 
a occurs_at s k 
s k precedes sk + 1, 
where s k is the current situation of D and sk+ 1 is a situation constant not 
occurring in D. For this description to be valid, D must contain the unique 
current situation, i.e., there must be a situation constant s k in D s.t. 
D ~ (s k = SN). It is not difficult to see that our algorithm guarantees this. 
We hope that the informal discussion in this section has convinced the reader 
that the ability to express the current situation, record facts and do hypothetical 
reasoning makes .ZP~ an interesting candidate for a language of a reasoning agent's 
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internal model. If nothing else it certainly can serve as a powerful specification 
language allowing rather concise description of the desired behavior of an agent. 
Much more work, of course, is needed to check if such an agent architecture can 
be efficiently implemented. Prospects of actual implementation critically depend on 
our understanding of the entailment relation of .~  and the ability to automate 
this relation. The next two sections contain a first step in this direction. 
7. APPROXIMATING THE ENTAILMENT RELATION OF S~ 
Our methodology for computing the entailment relation of Sal is based on 
translating a domain description D of -~1 into a declarative logical theory II o 
approximating the entailment of ~ in D from below and using a general purpose 
inference mechanism for II D to answer queries in D. The success of this approach 
depends critically on our ability to construct a IID which is a good (complete or 
almost complete) approximation of D and on the efficiency of the inference 
mechanism of H D. Most of the work related to computing the entailment relations 
of action description languages concentrated on the former and hence required 
rather powerful logics such as circumscription, disjunctive or abductive logic 
programming, etc. In contrast, in this paper we will concentrate on the latter (for 
sound and complete translation of -~ into circumscription see [BGP96]). 
Our translation l id of D will be a declarative logic program (under answer set 
semantics) used together with the inference mechanism incorporated in the stan- 
dard Prolog interpreter (as implemented, for instance, in Quintus Prolog). It is well 
known that in general this mechanism is not complete and- -due to the problems 
with floundering and absence of the occur check--may even be unsound. We show 
however that in our particular case this is not a problem since for any translation 
l Id of a domain description D obtained by the algorithm from the previous ection 
the Prolog interpreter is shown to be sound and complete w.r.t, liD's declarative 
semantics (see Corollary 7.1 below). 
We pay, of course, for the choice of the weak language, by a possible incom- 
pleteness of H o w.r.t.D. But even from this standpoint the situation is not as bad 
as one might expect. In general, there are two sources of incompleteness of HD: 
lack of information about the values of fluents in the initial situation and lack of 
information about occurrences of actions and temporal relations between situa- 
tions. Fortunately, domain descriptions built by agents constructed according to 
our architecture have "explicit actual paths" and hence allow only incompleteness 
of knowledge about values of fluents. The following definition clarifies the term. 
Definition 7.1. Let D be a consistent domain description and s o . . . . .  s k be a list of 
situation constants occurring in statements from D. We will say that D has an 
explicit actual path if 
(a) (s i precedes i+ 1) ~D (0 < i < k); 
(b) D ~ s~ = SN; 
(C) there is a sequence cr = [a 0 . . . . .  ak-1] of actions such that: 
• (a i occurs_at  s i) ~D (0 <i  <k)  and 
• D ~ (a  occurs_at So). 
It is easy to see that any D satisfying these conditions has a unique actual path; 
i.e., for any model (~,E)  of D and for every 0 < i  <k,  E(s i )= [a 0 . . . . .  a i _ l ]  and 
~(sN)  = ~(sk)  = a .  
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Definition 7.2. We will say that a domain description D is simple if 
1. D is consistent; 
2. D has an explicit actual path; 
3. all facts of D are atomic; and 
4. D does not contain contradictory causal laws. 
The last assumption in the definition is not essential. Its purpose is to make II u 
simpler. The assumption can be removed by adding rules to l id which define the 
executability of an action in a situation. 
Now, let us describe a program II D approximating the entailment relation of D. 
The degree of incompleteness of II o will depend only on the amount of informa- 
tion about the values of fluents in the initial situation lost in the process of 
translation. We will show that if our knowledge of these values is complete then so 
is the translation. In our further work we plan to investigate the use of abduction 
for narrowing the gap between D and H D. 
7.1. Logic Programming Approximation of D 
Let us proceed with the construction of logic programming approximation lID of 
D. The alphabet of 17Io will consist of symbols for actions, fluent literals and 
situations from the language of D, predicates true_at, true_after, all_trueafter, 
false_after, one_false_after, occurs_at, causes, imm_follows, current, contrary, 
member, fluent_literal and ab, and a standard Prolog function symbol [FirstEl[ 
RestOfList] for creating a list. We will use the following typed variables: 
A for actions 
R for lists of actions 
F, G for fluent literals 
P for lists of fluent literals 
All the variables can be indexed. The corresponding lower case letters will denote 
constants of respective types. Predicate symbol falseafter can be viewed as 
negation of true_after. To reflect this agreement we introduce an auxiliary termi- 
nology. We say that atoms true_after(-t) and false after(-t) (where ~ is a list of 
terms) are incompatible and that a program li in the above language is consistent if
it has an answer set and if no answer set of II contains incompatible atoms. 
Let D be a simple domain description with the explicit actual path a0,. . . ,  a k_ 1. 
The logic programming approximation II D of entailment of D will consist of the 
following rules: 
1. Domain Dependent Axioms 
(a) (AP) Description of Actual Path 
imm_follows ( l, So). 
imm_follows(  k, sk 1). 
occurs_at( ao, So). 
occurs-at(ak 1,Sk_I). 
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. 
(b) (BC) Boundary Conditions 
t rue_at ( f ,  si) ~ IID for each ( f  at si) ~D 
(c) (CL) Causal Laws 
causes( a, f , p )  ~ I I  D for each (a causes f if p)  ~D 
Domain Independent Axioms 
(a) (EA) Effects of actions 
e 1 . true_after( F, [ ], S) 
e 2 • t rue -a f te r (F , [ .4 lR] ,S )  
e 3. false_after(F,  R,  S)  
e 4. all_true_after([ ], R,  S ) .  
e 5. all t rue_a f ter ( [F [P l ,R ,S )  
e 6. one false_after(P,  R,  S) 
• - t rue_at (F ,S ) .  
• - causes(A ,F ,P ) ,  
all_true_after( P,  R ,  S ) . 
"- contrary( F,  G ) , 
true_after(G, R,  S ) . 
: -  true_after( F, R,  S ) , 
all_true_after( P,  R,  S ) . 
• - member( F,  P ) ,  
false_after(F,  R,  S ) . 
The first three axioms describe effects of  actions on individual fluents 
while axioms (e4)-(e 6) define truth and falsity for lists of fluent literals. 
(b) (FI) First Inertia Axiom 
il. tme_after( F , [ .41R] ,S )  
i 2 . ab(F , .4 ,R ,S )  : -  
(c) (SI) Second Inertia Axiom 
t rue_at(F ,  $2) : -  
3. Library Axioms 
(a) Contrary 14 
contrary( ~ F, F ) . 
contrary(F, ~ F ). 
: -  f luent_l i teral(F),  
true_after( F,  R,  S ) , 
not ab( F,  .4, R,  S ) . 
contrary( F,  G) ,  
causes( A ,  G, P ) , 
not one_false_after( P,  R ,  S ) . 
f luent_ l iteral(F), 
imm_fol lows( $2, S1), 
occurs_at( A1 ,S1) ,  
true_after(F, [ A 1], S1). 
14 The notation ~ F denotes the term neg(F). 
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(b) Member  
member(X,  [X  I ]). 
member(X,  [-I T ] ) : -  member( X,  T ) . 
Notice that relation fluent_literal(F) is not defined in l i D . We will assume that 
it is given by a list of atoms not containing "[ ]" and, hence, the truth of lists of 
fluents can only be established by axioms (e 4) and (es). 
It is important to realize that at this stage the rules of H D are ground 
instantiations of the above schemas where substitutions of variables by ground 
terms are done in accordance with definitions of their types. This means that 
occurrences of fluent_literal in the premises of the Inertia axioms are redundant 
and can be removed without any effect on the declarative meaning of the program. 
They will be needed though to ensure correctness of answers to queries given by 
the Prolog interpreter. 
7.2. Soundness and Completeness of  l i  D Entai lment 
In this subsection we formulate and show the soundness of l id with respect o D 
for simple domain descriptions. We also show that for a restricted class 17 D is 
complete with respect o D. 
Since D ~ f at s iff D ~ f after [ ] at s, from now on we will limit our query 
language to formulas of the form f after a at s. For any query q of this form, by 
7r(q) we will denote true_after(f, a, s). 
We will say that a (declarative) program 11o is sound w.r.t. D if l io is 
consistent and for any query q, if H D ~ 7r(q) then D ~ q. Let us now prove the 
soundness of 17 D. This will guarantee that the entailment relation of H D can be 
used to approximate the entailment of D. Before we state the theorem, we will 
show using the following example that H D is not always complete. 
Example 7.1. Consider the domain description: 
Facts: 
( f l )  a occurs_at s o 
( f2)  So precedes 1 
Dll = Laws: 
( l l )  a causes f if g 
(l 2) a causes f if ~ g 
Clearly, D11 ~f at s 1, while liOll does not entail 15 true_after(f,[ ], sl). 
The proof of the soundness theorem is based on the following lemmata. First, 
we will introduce some notation. Consider ground instantiations of all the rules of 
l i  D except the Second Inertia Axioms (SI) and the Description of Actual Path 
15To obtain completeness we can expand our program by the axiom "true at(g,s o) or 
trueat( ~ g, So)" (where or is the epistemic disjunction [GL91]) or use abduction. This approach works 
in general too but its usefulness depends somewhat on the development and availability of query 
answering systems for disjunctive and abductive programs. 
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(AP). The set of all such instantiations not containing any other situation constants 
except s i will be denoted by H i. It is easy to see that IID consists of the union of 
the sets H0, . . . ,  H k together with ground instantiations of SI and AP. 
Lemma 7.1. Consider a simple domain description D. Let Hi be obtained from l id 
by replacing (SI)  and (AP)  by 
true_at(F,  Si ) :-- true_after(F, [ a i l ], si-1 ). 
where 0 < i < k and (a i_ a occurs_at s i_ 1) E D. 
Then, for any query q in D, 171 ~ ~r(q) iff II D ~ ~r(q). 
PROOF. Follows immediately from the Splitting Lemma (see Appendix B). [] 
Lemma 7.2. Let D be a simple domain description. For any 0 < i <_ k and any 
collection I of formula of the form true_at(f ,  Si) s.t. D ~ f at s i the program H i C1 I 
has unique consistent answer set and is sound w.r.t. D. 
PROOF. It is easy to see that H i U I is acyclic and hence it has a unique answer set 
[AB90]. Let us denote it by 5~. We prove the soundness and consistency of H i U I 
by showing that for any f ,  r, si, p: 
(i) true_after(f, r, si) ~-~i  ==~ D ~ f after r at s i 
(ii) aU_true_after(p,r ,s  i) ~ i  ~ V f  ~ p. D ~ f after r at s i 
(iii) true_after(f, r, s i) ~ i  or false_after(f, r, s i) f~ i  
(iv) one_false_after(p, r  s i) q~i  or 3 f  ~ p. true_after(f, r, s i) f~ i  
The statements (i) and (ii) guarantee soundness and the statements (iii) and (iv) 
guarantee consistency of H i U I. 
Let us use induction on the length of r in formulae (i)-(iv). 
Base Case: length of r is O. 
(i.0) true_after(f, [ ], s i) ~ i  
iff 
true_at(f ,  s i) ~ i  (el) 
iff 
true_at(f ,  s i) ~ I or true_at(f ,  s i) ~ H i 
implies 
D ~ f at s i. 
(ii.0) (By inducton on the length of p) 
base: length of p is 0 (vacuously true) 
Inductive hypothesis: If length of p is less than m then 
all_true_after(p,[ ], si) ~ i  
implies 
for all f in  p, D~fa f ter [  ]a t  s r 
Induction: Since length p is greater than zero there exists a fluent g and a 
(possibly empty) list of fluents p' such that p = [gift]. Then 
all_true_after(p, [ ], si ) ~ i  
iff 
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true_after(g,[ ],si) ~ /  and al l_true_after(p' ,[  ],Si) E~/  (e 5) 
implies 
D~gaf ter [  ]at s i and 
for all f in p', D ~f  after [ ] at s i ((i.0) and inductive hypothesis). 
implies 
for all f in p, D ~f  after [ ] at s i. (since p = [glP']) 
(iii.0) Since D is a consistent domain description: 
D ~ f at s i or D ~ -~ f at s i 
i.e., 
true_at( f , si) q~ H i U l ortrue_at( ~ f , si) f~ H i U I 
Since there are no other rules in H i U I with heads formed by the predicate 
true_at, we have that true_at( f ,  s i) ~S~ or true_at( -7 f ,  s i) ¢£~i. Hence, by e 1 and 
e 3, we obtain: 
true_after(f ,  [ ], si ) ~ i  or false_after(f ,  [ 1, si ) ¢~i .  
(iv,0) (by induction on the length of p) 
Base: length of p is 0. 
The only rule with one false_after in the head whose first argument is a list is 
e6, But when the first argument of one_false_after is [ ], no ground instance of 
the body of e6 belongs to ~/ (since there is no g such that member(g, [ ]) ~S'~i) 
and hence one_false_after([ ], [ ], s i) q~S~i. 
lndutive hypothesis: 
If the length of p is less than m, then either one_false_after(p,  [ ], s i) f~ i  or 
there exists an f in p such that true_after(f,  [ ], s i) ¢£~i. 
Induction: Since length of p is greater than zero there exists a fluent g and a 
(possibly empty) list of fluents p' such that p = [g[p']. 
By inductive hypothesis, either 
(a o) one false_after(p',[  ],s i) q~i  or 
(b 0) there exists an f in p' s.t. true_after(f,  [ ], s i) ¢~S~i. 
If case (b 0) is true when we are finished, since p' cp .  
Now, consider case (a0); by using (iii.0) we have that either 
(a 1) false_after(g,[ ],s i) ~ i  or 
(b 1) true_after(g,[ ],si) ~ i. 
If case (b 1) is true then we are done since g ~p.  
Now consider the case when (a 0) and (a 1) are true. 
Using e6, I_emma B.1 (from Appendix B) and (a 0) we have that there is no 
f~p '  such that false_after(f ,  [ ], s i) ~ i .  The fact that p = [glP'] together with 
(a l) implies that there is no f~p  such that false_after(f ,[  ], s i) ~ i .  
As a result, for no instance of (e 6) with one_false_after(p,  [ ], s i) in the head its 
body belongs to ~/ and hence one false_after(p, [ ], s i) f~ i .  
Inductive Step: Suppose (i)-(iv) are true when the length of r is less than n. Let 
us prove that it is true when length of r is n. 
226 c .  BARAL ET AL. 
Since length of r is greater than zero, let us assume r = [a Jr']. 
(i.n) true_after(f, r, s i) •~ 
iff 
(case a) (causes(a, f ,  p) •U~i and all_true_after(p, r', s i) •~ i )  or 
(case b) ( t rue_ater ( f , r ' , s i )•SP i )  and ab(f ,a , r ' ,s i )  q~ i. (Using e 2, i 1 and 
Lemma B.1) 
(case a) From the inductive hypothesis we have that 
all_true_after(p, r', s i) •U~) 
implies 
for a l l f inp ,  D~fa f ter r '  at s i. 
It is easy to see that causes(a, f ,  p) •S~i iff (a causes f if p) • D. 
Since our domain descriptions do not contain contradictory causal laws, a is 
executable after the execution of r' in the situation s i. Hence, f after r at si 
must be true in all models of D. Therefore, D ~f  after r at si. 
(case b) From the inductive hypothesis we have true_after(f, r', s i) •~/ )  implies 
D ~f  after r'at s i. (i.n.b.1) 
ab( f , a, r', s i) ¢~i  
iff 
for any pair a and p, if causes(a , f ,p )•~i i  then one_false_after(p, r', s i) •~ i  
(from i 2 and Lemma .1) 
iff 
If (a causes f if p) • D then for some g in p, true_after(~, r', s i) •~ i  (Using 
e6, e 3 and Lemma B.1) 
iff 
If (a causes f if p )•D then for some g in p, D ~ after r' at s i (Using 
inductive hypothesis.) (i.n.b.2) 
If f is a positive fluent literal then (i.n.b.1) implies that f•  ~(E(si)o r'), and 
(i.n.b.2) implies that f ¢~ Ea ( qt(]~(si )o r')). i.e., f•  a'It(E(Si )° r' o a). That means 
D ~f  after r at s~. The reasoning when f is a negative fluent literal is similar. 
(ii.n) The proof is the same (modulo replacing [ ] by r) as the proof in ii.0. 
(iii.n) We will show that true_after(f, r, s i) •~ i  and false_after(f,  r, s i) •~ i  
cannot be true at the same time. 
Suppose true_after(f, r, s i) ~ i .  From (i.n) we have D ~f  after r at s i. 
(iii.n.1) Now, sup_pose fa lse_after( f , r ,s  i) •~i .  Using e 3 _and Lemma A.1 we 
have true_after(f, r, s i) •~ i .  Using (i,,) we will have D ~f  after r at s i. 
(iii.n.2) 
Since D is consistent we cannot have both (iii.n.1) and (iii.n.2) to be true. 
Hence, we have a contradiction, i.e., our initial assumption was false. Finally, 
either true_after(f, r, s i) ~/~i or fa l sea f ter ( f ,  r, s i) q~i .  
(iv.n) The proof is the same (modulo replacing [ ] by r) as the proof in iu.0. [] 
Now we can move forward to reintroduce a connection between situations 
actually following one another and prove an equivalent of the Lemma above. To 
this purpose, let li (0 < i < k) be the rule 
true_at( f ,  si) :-- true_after(f, [ ai_ 1 ], s i 1) 
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Lemma 7.3. For any 0 < m < k, the program Tin: 
T m =H 0 U (l I UH1)  U ..- U ( l  m UHm) 
has a unique answer set and is sound w.r.t. D. 
PaooF.  By induction on m. 
Base Case: m = 0. Conclusion of the lemma follows immediately from Lemma 
7.2. 
Inductive step: Obviously, T m = T m _ 1 U (lm U Hm). By inductive hypotheses Tm 1 
has a unique consistent answer set B m 1. Notice, that the set U = head(T m ,) 
(see Appendix 9) forms a spitting [LT94] set for T m and hence 
1. B m is an answer set of T m iff B m = B m 1 U C where C is an answer set of 
the partial evaluation eu(l  m u Hm, B m _ 1) of (l m U H m) w.r.t. B m - 1" Also, 
2. eu( l  m UHm,  B m 1)=Hm UI  m where 
I m = {t rue_at ( f ,  Sm):Tin_ 1 ~true_af ter ( f , [a  m 1] ,S in - l )}  • 
By inductive hypotheses Tm_ 1 is sound w.r.t. D and hence 2. implies that for any 
fluent literal f s.t. true a t ( f , s  m) E Im,  D ~t rueaf ter ( f , [am_ l ] , s  m 1). Let E(s k) 
be the actual path of D. Then E(sm) = "£(Sm 1) ° a m 1 and hence D ~f  at sm. 
Therefore, Im satisfies the conditions of  Lemma 7.2 and hence I m U H m have 
unique consistent answer set C and is sound w.r . t .D.  This, together with 1. above, 
implies the conclusion of Lemma 7.3 for T m. [] 
Theorem 7.1 (Soundness of  I io).  For any simple domain description D its logic 
programming approximation II D is sound w.r.t. D. 
P~oov. It is easy to see that T k as defined in Lemma 7.3 is the same as H 1. Hence 
from Lemma 7.3 the program l-I 1 is sound w.r . t .D.  From Lemma 7.1 the program 
H 1 is equivalent o I-I v. Hence, H v is sound w.r . t .D.  [] 
Theorem 7.2 (Restricted soundness and completeness). For any simple domain 
description D with explicit complete information about the initial state (i.e., for  any 
fluent f in  the language either f at s o or ~ f at s o is in D)  its logic programming 
approximation I] o is sound and complete w.r.t. D. 
PROOF. It is easy to see that D has a unique model M and from Lemmata 7.1, 7.2 
and 7.3, I I  v has a unique answer set S z. Since Theorem 7.1 proves the soundness 
we only need to prove the completeness. To prove the completeness it suffices to 
prove Lemma 7.4 below. [] 
Lemma 7.4. Let  D be a simple domain description with explicit complete information 
about the initial state and I]D be its logic programming approximation. Let I] 1 be 
as defined in Lemma 7.1. Then D ~ f after r at s i implies H 1 ~ true_after( f ,  r, si). 
PROOF. Notice that D has a unique model M= (qt, E) and II 1 has a unique 
answer set ~ .  We now use induction on the indexes of situations. 16 
16 For a situation si, by its index we mean the number i. 
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Base case: index is 0. 
Suppose D ~f  after r at s 0. We need to show that true_after(f, r, s o) •S: .  We 
prove this by induction on the length of r. 
Base case: length of r is 0. 
D~faf ter [  ]a t  s o 
iff 
D ~f  at s o 
iff 
f at s o • D (Since D is consistent and has complete information about the 
initial state.) 
iff 
true_at(f,  s o) • 131 
implies 
true_after(f, [ ], so) •S :  
inductive hypothesis: If length of r is less than n then D ~f  after r at s o implies 
true_after(f, r, s o) •~.  
induction: Since length of r is greater than 0, let r = [a Ir']. 
Let D ~f  after r at s o 
iff 
f •  ~( r )  
iff 
f • ~( r ' )  U E+(a, ~(r ' ) )  \ E- (a ,  ~(r ' ) )  
iff 
(a) f•  ~(r ' )  \E - (a ,~( r ' ) ) ,  or 
(b) f•E+(a ,~( r ' ) ) .  
(case a) It is easy to see that f•  ~( r ' )  iff D ~f  after r' at s o 
This implies (using the inductive hypothesis) that 
true_after(f, r', s o) •S: .  a.1 
f C~ E - (  a, ~(r ' ) )  
iff 
If (a causes f if p) • D then for some g in p, D ~ g after r' at s o 
iff 
If (a causes f if p) • D then for some g in p, true_after(g, r', s i) •S :  (Using 
inductive hypothesis) 
iff 
for any pair a and p, if causes(a, f ,p )•5 :  then one_false_after(p, r', s o) •S :  
(Using e 6, e 3 and Lemma B.1) 
iff 
ab(f, a, r', So) ~ (from i 2 and Lemma B.1) a.2 
From a.1, a.2 and il using Lemma B.1 we have that true_after(f, r, s o) •S: .  
(case b) f•  E+(a, ~(r ' ) )  
iff 
There is a proposition (a causes f if p) in D such that for all g in p, D ~ g 
after r' at s o 
implies 
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causes(a, f ,p)  ~S ° and for all g in p, true_after(g,r ' ,s  o) ~5 ° (By 1.(c) in the 
program rio and using inductive hypothesis) 
implies 
causes(a, f ,  p)  ESP and al l_true_after(p,  r ' ,s o) ~ow (Using ii.0 in the Proof of 
Lemma 7.2 in the reverse direction). 
implies 
true_after(f,  r, s o) ~S p (Using r 2 in the program II o and Lemma B.1). 
Inductive Step: Suppose D ~f  after r at s~ implies true_after(f,  r, s o) ~S ° for 
all s n, when n < i. Let us prove that it is true for s i. 
We prove this by induction on the length of r. 
base case: length of r is O. 
D~faf te r [  ]at  s i 
iff 
D ~f  at s i 
iff 
D ~f  after [ai_l] at s i 1 
implies 
true_after(f,  [a i_ 1], si 1) ~S~ (by inductive hypothesis) 
implies 
t rueat ( f ,  s i) ~ (Using l i and Lemma B.1.) 
implies 
true_after(f,[  ], s i) ~S  p (Using e I and Lemma A.1.) 
inductive hypothesis: If length r is less than n then D ~f  after r at s i implies 
true_after(f, r, s i) ~S  "~. 
induction: We need to show that when length of r is n, D ~f  after r at s i 
implies t rueaf ter ( f ,  r, s i) ~5  a. 
The proof of this case is similar to that for i = 0. [] 
7.3. Comput ing  with I I  o 
We now proceed in the direction of implementing the declarative logic programs 
obtained by the translations. Theorem 7.1 guarantees soundness of II o viewed as a 
declarative logic program. If we want to use a computer to actually answer queries 
to rl D we need to use a particular query answering algorithm. The Prolog 
interpreter, based on the unification algorithm and SLDNF proof procedure with 
leftmost selection rule [C1a78, AD94], is certainly the most popular among the 
large family of such algorithms and seems to be a natural choice for use in this 
paper. The following theorems ensure that it can be used safely. 
Before formulating the result we will change our notational convention. In what 
follows we will stop identifying li D with the collection of ground instances of its 
rules where variables are replaced by ground terms in accordance with definitions 
of their sorts. Instead, l io  should be viewed as a logic program with variables (used 
as an input by the Prolog interpreter). The collection of all its ground instances in 
(unsorted) language of IID will be denoted by li~; the collection of ground 
instances obtained from l io by substitutions honoring sorts will be denoted by II~. 
As before, our queries will be ground atoms in the sorted language. In the 
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following proofs 11 o will be used mainly when we talk about Prolog inference while 
II~ will be used when referring to the declarative semantics. 
Theorem 7.3. For any simple domain description D, its logic programming approxima- 
tion liD, and a query q the Prolog interpreter is sound w.r.t, l i1, i.e., if the answer 
of Prolog to 7r(q) is: 
yes then II~ ~ 7r(q); 
no then I l l  ~ 7r( q). 
PROOF. See discussion and Lemmata below. [] 
As mentioned above the Prolog interpreter can be viewed as implementation f 
SLDNF resolution with the Prolog selection rule which, at every step, selects for 
resolution the leftmost literal. We will assume familiarity with the notion of an 
SLDNF tree for a query 7r(q) (w.r.t. program II) as presented, for instance, in 
[AB94]. Each such tree corresponds to a possible selection rule. 
If the rule always selects the leftmost literal the corresponding tree is called 
LDNF-tree. 17 Branches of the LDNF tree for ~-(q) represent all possible LDNF 
derivations in 17 U {~(q)}; their nodes contain goals--finite sequences of atoms 
possibly preceded by not. Each finite branch ends with a node marked by success 
(the node contains the empty query), flounder (the leftmost member of the node's 
goal is an atom preceded by not and containing an uninstantiated variable), or 
failed (no other resolution is possible). In general, some of the branches of the tree 
can, of course, be infinite. 
The LDNF resolution proof procedure can be viewed as search of this tree T. 
For ground queries this search returns yes if the particular subtree T o (called the 
main tree) of T contains a branch with final node marked by success and no if all 
branches of T o have final nodes marked by failed. It is well known that the 
algorithm is sound w.r.t, answer set semantics, i.e., if its answer to ~-(q) is yes then 
II ~ ~r(q), if the answer is no then no answer set of II contains 7r(q). 
The actual Prolog interpreter (A Prolog interpreter uses a particular ordering of 
branches, corresponding to top-down selection of rules of li for resolution but the 
distinction is irrelevant since our results will hold for all such orderings.) used in 
various Prolog systems can be viewed as an implementation of the LDNF proof 
procedure with two important exceptions: 
1. it allows selection of non-ground queries of the form notp, i.e., floundering is
ignored; 
2. implementation f the unification algorithm omits the occur check and may, 
therefore, produce unsound results. 
These observations suggest he following structure of the proof. 
(a) First, we demonstrate that for every ground query 7r(q), IID U {~-(q)} is 
occur-check free [AP94], i.e., the nondeterministic unification algorithm of 
Martelli and Montanari [MM82] (whose variants are normally implemented 
in Prolog interpreters) never selects a step requiring the occur check. 
(b) Next, let us show that LDNF-trees for ground queries in IID do not have 
nodes marked by flounder. 
The observations above imply that for ground queries to l id the differences 
between Prolog interpreter and LDNF proof procedure can be ignored and hence, 
17 The tree here is viewed as a directed graph and hence the ordering of branches is ignored. 
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by soundness theorem for LDNF we have that for any query 7r(q) if the Prolog 
answer to ~(q)  is yes then ll I ~ 7r(q) and if the answer is no then H I  I¢ 7r(q). 
We proceed by proving the following lemmas. 
Lemma 7.5. For a simple domain description D, the program ri o is occur-check free 
w.r.t, ground queries. 
PROOF. To prove the lemma we need the notion of well-moded program. The 
concept, due to Dembinski and Maluszynski [DM85], proved to be useful for 
establishing various properties of logic programs. We will need the following 
terminology: 
By a mode for an n-ary predicate symbol p we mean a function dp from 
{1 . . . .  ,n} to the set {+, -}.  If dp(i) ='+'  the i is called an input position of p and 
if dp( i )= ' - '  the i is called an output position of p. We write dp in the form 
p(dp(1) . . . . .  dp(n)). Intuitively, queries formed by predicate p will be expected to 
have input positions occupied by ground terms. To simplify the notation, when 
writing an atom as p(u, v), we assume that u is the sequence of terms filling in the 
input positions of p and that ~, is the sequence of terms filling in the output 
positions. By l(u,v) we denote expressions of the form p(u, v) or not p(u,v); 
var(s) denotes the set of all variables occurring in s. Assignment of modes to the 
predicate symbols of a program li is called input-output specification. 
A rule po(to, s m + 1 ) ~-" ll(s 1, t 1 ) . . . . .  lm(Sm, t m) is called well-moded w.r.t, its input 
output specification if for i ~ [1, m + 1], var(si) c_ O}21var(t~). In other words, a 
rule is well-moded if
(i) every variable occurring in an input position of a body goal occurs either in 
an input position of the head or in an output position of an earlier body 
goal; 
(ii) every variable occurring in an output position of the head occurs in an input 
position of the head, or in an output position of a body goal. 
A program is called well-moded w.r.t, its input-output specification if all its rules 
are. 
Apt and Pellegrini in [AP94] showed that if II is well-moded (for some input 
output specification) and there is no rule in ri whose head contains more than one 
occurrence of the same variable in its output positions then II is occur-check free 
w.r.t, any ground query q. Consider the following input output specification for II D. 
true_after(- ,  +, +) 
all_true_after(-, +, +) 
false_after( +, +, + ) 
one_false_after( +, +, + ) 
true_at( - ,  + ) 
ab(+,  +,  +,  +)  
causes( +, - ,  - )  
contrary( - ,  - ) 
member( - ,  + ) 
imm_follows( , ) 
occurs_at( , ). 
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It is easy to check that II o is well-moded (w.r.t. this specification) and that it also 
satisfies the second condition of Apt-Pellegrini's Theorem. This concludes the 
proof. [] 
Lemma 7.6. For a simple domain description D, a query 7r(q) to 11 D does not 
flounder, i.e., the LDNF-tree of rr(q) does not have nodes marked by flounder. 
PROOF. To prove the lemma we use another theorem from [AP94] which was also 
independently discovered by Stroetman [Str93]: if 11 is well-moded (for some input 
output specification) and all predicate symbols occurring under not in 17 are 
moded completely by input then a ground query ~-(q) to II does not flounder. The 
only two predicate symbols occurring under not in II o are one_false_after and 
ab. They both are completely input under the specification from I_emma 7.5. [] 
By proving Lemma 7.6, also Theorem 7.3 remains finally proved. 
The next theorems guarantee that the Prolog interpreter is complete w.r.t. H 1, 
i.e., it does not miss any answers entailed by the declarative program and that its 
answers are sound w.r.t.D. We need the following lemma. 
Lemma 7.7. For a simple domain description D, and for any query 7r(q) to liD: 
IIZD ~ 7r( q) iff II~ ~ ~r( q). 
PROOF. To prove the lemma we use the notion of language tolerance from [MT94]. 
Let II be a program in a language _~, -~1 and 22 be languages containing .~, 
and 111 and I12 be instantiations of 17I by ground terms of -~1 and -~2. Languages 
-~1 and -~2 are called permissible for li. Program 11 is called language tolerant if, 
for any two languages -~1 and -~2 that are permissible for 17 the following holds: 
for any consistent answer set A 1 of 111 there is a consistent answer set A 2 of [[2 
such that A 1 C/.~ 2=A 2 n_~ 1. Obviously, II2D C HI ,  and therefore, the language -~1 
of l i~ is an extension of the language -~2 of 11~ and both contain constants 
occurring in 11D- To prove the lemma it suffices to show that liD is language 
tolerant. In [MT94] McCain and Turner give a sufficient condition for tolerance 
which uses the notions of stability and predicate-order-consistency. Let II be a 
program with input output specification. A rule r: 
po( So,to) *'-pl( Sl,t l) , . . . ,  pm( Sm,tm),nOt pm+ l( Sm+ l,trn+ l) ..... nOt pn( Sn,tn) 
is said to be stable (w.r.t. this specification) if for any variable x from r, x ~ s o or 
there is 1 < i < m such that x ~ var(t i) and for any 1 _<j < i, x ~ sj. Program H is 
called stable w.r.t, an input output specification if all of its rules are. li is stable if 
it is stable w.r.t, some input output specification (this definition of stability is given 
in [Str93]. McCain and Turner's definition is substantially more general). The 
notion of predicate order consistency from [MT94] is similar to the notion of order 
consistency from [Fag90]. Predicate dependency graph G(II) of a program li has 
the nodes which are predicate symbols of II. There is a positive edge in G(P) from 
predicate symbol q to predicate symbol p if there is a rule in 17 whose head 
contains expression p( . . . )  and whose body contains expression q(. . .) .  There is a 
negative dge in G(P) from predicate symbol q to predicate symbol p if there is a 
rule in II whose head contains expression p( . . . )  and whose body contains 
expression ot q(.. .).  We say that the relation p < q holds iff there is a path in 
G(II) from p to q with an even number of negative dges and a path from p to q 
with an odd number of negative dges, li is predicate-order-consistent if p < q is 
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well-founded and there is no predicate symbol p in li such that p _<p. McCain 
and Turner prove that if H is stable and predicate-order-consistent, then l-I is 
language tolerant. Given the definitions and the input-output specification from 
Lemma 7.5 it is easy to check that both conditions of the theorem are satisfied. 
This ends the proof of the lemma. [] 
Theorem 7.4. For any simple domain description D, its logic programming approxima- 
tion liD, and a query q if l i~ ~ It(q) then the Prolog's answer to ~r(q) is yes, 
otherwise, the answer is no. 
PROOF. Since, by Lemma 7.6 the LDNF tree for ~r(q) does not have floundering 
nodes it suffices to prove that the Prolog interpreter always terminates, i.e., LDNF 
tree for ~r(q) is finite. There are many sufficient conditions for termination in the 
literature. Probably the best known being the acyclicity condition from [AB90]. 
Unfortunately, because of the rules (e 1) and (SI), the program II D is not acyclic 
and hence we need a more subtle termination condition, We will use the notion of 
acceptable program from lAP91]. 
First, let us introduce some terminology. Let l i  be a general ogic program and 
p and q be predicate symbols from the language of li. Then p refers to q if there 
is a rule l i  with p in its head and q in its body, and p depends on q if [p, q] 
belongs to the transitive closure of refers. Let Neg be the set of predicate symbol in 
li that occur under not in the body of some rule in lI and let Neg* be the set of 
all predicate symbols in the language of lI on which the predicate symbols from 
Neg depend on. By H-  we denote a program consisting of all rules from li  whose 
heads contain predicate symbols from Neg*. Its Clark's completion is denoted by 
comp(l i - ) .  A model of 1I is called good if its restriction to the predicates from 
Neg* is a model of comp(I I -) .  A mapping from ground atoms of l i into the set of 
natural numbers is called level mapping of li. A program li is acceptable w.r.t, its 
level mapping [ [ and interpretation I if 
1. I is a good model of l i and 
2. for every rule A o ~- L 1 . . . .  L m where L i is an atom or an atom preceded by 
not, and any 0 < i  <m we have that I~L I , . . . , L  i or HA01> eLi+l]. 
A program li  is called acceptable if it is acceptable w.r.t, some level mapping ] ] 
and interpretation I of 11. Apt and Pedreschi n [AP91] proved that if l-I is an 
acceptable program and y a ground query then all LDNF derivations of l i u y are 
finite and therefore the Prolog interpreter terminates on y. To use this result we 
need to prove that II D is an acceptable program. First let us notice that II~ = II D. 
As was shown before, l i~ has stable model. This, together with Lemma 7.7, implies 
that i l l  also has stable model, say I. It is well known that a stable model of a 
program is also a model of its Clark's completion which implies that I is a good 
model of l i D . 
Let c be the number of fluent literals in the language of D plus 1; p be a fluent 
literal or a list of fluent literals; r be an action or a list of action; and s i (0 _< i _< k) 
be a situation constant from D. Then 
for any action a, lal = 1, I[ ]1 = 1, and for any list [a[r ]  of actions I[a Ir]l = Irl + 1 
Also, for any fluent literal f ,  Ifl = 1, I[ ]l = 1, and for any list [flP] of fluent literals 
I[flp]i = Ipl + 1. 
Isil = i + 1 .  
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Now we are ready to define a level mapping I I for IIo: 
lone_false_after( p, r, s ) l=  4c * Isl + 2c * Irl + I pl + 3 
I false_after(f, r, s)l = 4c * Isl + 2c * Irl + Ifl + 3 
lall_true_after( p, r, s)l = 4c * Isl + 2c * Irl + I pl + 2 
Itrue_afier(f, r, s)l = 4c * Isl + 2c * Irl + Ifl + 2 
l ab ( f ,a , r , s ) l=4c*  Isl+ 2c* ( I r l+  1) + l f l+  1 
Itrue_at(f, s)l = 4c * Isl + 2c + Ill + 1 
while Imemberl is equal to the length of its second parameter, [contrary] = 1, and all 
other atoms are mapped into 0. It is not difficult to see that II o is acceptable w.r.t. 
I I and I. This implies that every SLDNF tree for ~-(q) is finite (including, of 
course, its LDNF tree) which completes the proof of the Theorem. [] 
Corollary 7.1. For any simple domain description D, its logic programming approxima- 
tion liD, and a query q 
II1D ~ ~(  q ) iff the erolog' s answer to 7r( q ) is yes, and 
H a ~ ~(q)  iffthe Prolog's answerto 7r(q) is no. 
PROOF. Follows immediately from theorems 3 and 4. [] 
The following theorem guarantees oundness of our Prolog based algorithm 
w.r.t, entailment in D. 
Theorem 7.5. For any simple domain description D, its logic programming approxima- 
tion liD, and query q if the Prolog 's answer to ~r( q ) is yes then D ~ q. 
PROOF. Notice that in Theorem 7.1 entailment w.r.t. IID corresponds to entail- 
ment in 172 and hence we have that II~ is sound w.r.t .D. Therefore, the proof 
follows immediately from Lemma 7.7 and Theorems 7.1 and 7.3. [] 
Corollary 7.2. For any simple domain description D with explicit complete information 
about the initial state, its logic programming approximation li D, and a query q 
D ~ q iff the Prolog's answer to 7r (q) is yes, and 
D ~: q iffthe Prolog's answer to 7r(q) is no. 
PROOF. Follows immediately from Theorem 7.2, Corollary 7.1 and Lemma 7.7. [] 
8. IMPLEMENTING AN .~-PLANNER 
In this section we use the logic programming approximation from Section 7 to 
construct an implementation of a _SP-planner from Section 6. As before, we assume 
that the domain description D used by the planner is simple. 
The implementation f 2-plan is obtained by combining H o (the logic program- 
ming approximation of the domain description D) with the rules CSl-CS 4 that 
define the current situation, the rules g~, g2 for breadth-first search through the 
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space of possible action sequences, i  and the rule p that defines a generate-and-test 
planner. 
cs 1. sit(So). 
cs 2. sit( Si+l) : -  sit( Si) , 
imm_fol lows( Si + 1, Si). 
cs 3. pas t (S )  : -  imm_fol lows( S1, S ) .  
cs 4. cur rent (S) : -  s i t (S) ,  
not past( S ) . 
gl. generate([ ]). 
g2. generate([ X lY  ]) : -  generate( Y ) ,  
ac t ion(X) .  
p. f ind plan( a,  F)  : -generate(a) ,  
current(S),  
true_after( F, a,  S ) . 
Using the results from the previous section we can easily show that plans 
produced by the above planner are correct and that the shortest plan is found first. 
Moreover, Theorem 2 guarantees completeness of the program w.r.t. D for fully 
known initial situations, i.e., if there is a plan in D to achieve a given goal then the 
plan will be found. Of course, the program .~-plan does not always terminate, but 
we can limit the length of plans or guarantee termination by imposing some other 
conditions. The planner has several attractive features: 
1. It is simple, has a clear declarative specification and can be proven correct 
w.r.t, this specification. 
2. It allows (on-line) introduction of new objects into the domain, as well as 
addition of new information about values of fluents and occurrences of 
actions. 
The alphabet of .~ may have objects (fluents, actions, and situations) that do 
not appear in a particular domain description. Hence we may add new 
propositions to the domain description that contain objects that were not in 
the domain description before. 
3. It is nonmonotonic, i.e., capable of creating new plans when new information 
invalidates the old one. 
Nonmonotonism is particularly useful in the design of autonomous agents 
[Mae91], where the agent may have to plan, execute part of the plan, observe 
the world and, if necessary, make a new plan. 
4. It can easily incorporate heuristics and/or  domain constraints (of both the 
static and dynamic kind). 
Domain constraints and heuristics may either be given as part of the 
specification or obtained via a learning program. For example, consider a 
18 We assume that relation action(X), read as "X is an action from domain D", is supplied by the 
programmer. 
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case where we have domain knowledge that allows us to rule out the testing 
of certain sequences of actions. Now, if the domain has the property that if a 
sequence of action a does not satisfy the domain constraints then no 
sequence of actions that has a as a prefix satisfies the domain constraints; 
then the rule g2 can be modified into g~, defined as follows: 
generate( [ X[ Y ] ) :- generate(Y), action(X), satisfies_dom_constr( X, Y ) , 
where satisfies_dom_constr(X, Y)means that the sequence of actions [X[Y] 
satisfies the domain constraints. 
As an example, the simple domain constraint saying that sequences of 
actions should not have the same action occurring consecutively can be 
expressed by the following rules together with gl and g~: 
satisfies_dom_constr( X,  Y)  :- nonviolates_dom_constr( X,  Y ) . 
violates_dom_ constr ( X,  [ X[ Z ]). 
5. It can be easily expanded to accommodate advances in action description 
languages. 
Although planners are expanding their languages [BGPW93], currently 
most of them use a subset of ADL [Ped94]. Recently, research in logic 
programming theories of actions has progressed rapidly and we have logic 
programming theories that allow incomplete information about the initial 
state [GL92, DDS93, Dun93], concurrent actions [BG93, BT94], ramifications 
[Bar95], etc. Given a fluent f and a sequence of actions a, these theories 
determine the truth of f after execution of a. Hence, they can be directly 
used in conjunction with rules CSl-CS 4, gl-g2 and p to extend _~-plan. 
Before working on extending the planner to more general domains and doing 
serious comparison of our approach with other existing approaches to planning, we 
wanted to learn more about its efficiency. To do that we tested our planner on 
several domains 19 such as the blocks world, briefcase and the home-owner's 
domains [BGPW93, We194] that are used is evaluating planners. 
When we expanded our planner with the additional knowledge that prohibits 
generation of impossible actions, the performance ( xecution time) of our planner 
was comparable with that of UCPOP [BGPW93]. 
We have also briefly looked at two other ways at improving performance: 
(a) to combine imperative and declarative paradigms of programming. For 
instance, we replaced the Prolog generate procedure by one written in C. 
This gave an order of magnitude improvement in performance without the 
loss of declarativeness of II D that was used in testing; 
(b) to use multiple processors. The generate-and-test programs are the exact 
kind of programs that give maximum speed-up in a parallel computer with a 
parallel logic program interpreter/compiler (that exploits or-parallelism). 
Preliminary testing showed what we expected. The performance was close to 
n times better when we used n processors. 
19 These domains can be obtained from fip://june.cs.washington.edu/homes/weld/ucpop.html 
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We would like to point out that our performance results are preliminary. They 
just indicate a possible trend. Since we did not test with a large number of 
randomly generated queries and the compiler used in our testing is different from 
that used for UCPOP, 2° we do not in any way claim that our proposed planners are 
more efficient. However, we believe that Se'-planners of the sort described in this 
section are very promising and deserve further investigation. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed the modification -~1 of the action description language 
capable of expressing actual situations, observations of the truth values of fluents 
in these situations, and observations of actual occurrences of actions. The entail- 
ment relation of -~1 allows modeling of various types of hypothetical reasoning. 
This feature, together with the ability to denote the current actual situation, allows 
to reason about the design and correctness of plans in a changing environment. 
We have discussed a possible application of -~1 and its entailment relation to an 
architecture of intelligent agents and presented a provenly correct implementation 
of the planning module of this architecture in Prolog. 
We plan to expand this work in several directions. 
• The syntax and semantics of -~1 should be expanded to deal with partially 
defined actions, to allow concurrent and nondeterministic actions [BG93, 
KL94, BT94], and global constraints [KL94], etc. 
• More general and more efficient methods of computing the entailment of 
and its extensions hould be found. One possibility is to investigate other 
inference mechanisms which are sound w.r.t, declarative logic programming 
semantics. For programs with unique answer sets, the SLX procedure from 
[AD94, ADP95] is a promising candidate. It computes answers w.r.t, the 
well-founded [VGRS91, PAA92] semantics of logic programs and hence is 
sound w.r.t, the answer set semantics. An interesting and challenging prob- 
lem is to expand SLX by allowing disjunction and therefore reasoning by 
cases. 
• Another promising direction of research is related to extension and elabora- 
tion of the planner from Section 8. One obvious approach is to modify the 
procedure generate to produce only those sequences of actions which are 
relevant o the goal and to use domain dependent heuristics. 
• Finally, we also need to design and implement other modules in the architec- 
ture. Here the use of abduction seems to be promising. 
Our work is a continuation of the approach of formalizing actions suggested in 
[GL92] which is deeply rooted in situation calculus [MH69, GLR91]. Our formal- 
ization, especially in its logic programming form, can be viewed as a combination of 
situation calculus with another prominent approach to formalizing actions--the 
event calculus of [KS86]. To the best of our knowledge the first paper combining 
the two in one formalism is [PR93]. Ideologically, their approach is similar to ours. 
20 UCPOP is written in LISP while our programs are written in Quintus PROLOG or Quintus 
PROLOG + C. 
238 c. BARAL ET AL. 
In [PR93] situation calculus is presented as a theory of classical logic (with some 
second order features) and plays the role of our action description language. Our 
approach seems to allow more forms of incompleteness in the representation of
the domain, but investigation of the precise relationship is a subject for future 
work. Some of the other recent works that combine event calculus and situation 
calculus are [MS94, Pro96, VBDDS95]. Amongst them the approach in [MS94] is 
closest o ours. Their function state that maps time points to situations is similar to 
our E which maps situation constants to sequences of actions. But they assume 21 
that the domain description includes all occurrences of actions and they only allow 
fluent facts about the initial situations. Our approach is more general with respect 
to these restrictions. On the other hand, [MS94] contains discussions of allowing 
concurrent, divisible and overlapping actions, which we do not discuss in this paper. 
APPENDIX  A: HYPOTHESES IN DOMAIN DESCRIPTION 
As promised in Section 5, we now consider the impact of allowing hypothesis [i.e., 
statements of the form (2)] in domain descriptions of -~1- The definition of a model 
is now modified by adding the condition specifying when a hypothesis is true in an 
interpretation (see Definition 1) to Definition 3. All other definitions (in Section 3) 
remain the same. Let us now consider the following example. 
Example A.1. Consider a domain description 
D 6 = 
Facts: 
( f l )  ~f l  A ~f2 A ~f3 at s o 
( f2) so precedes l 
( f3) f l  at s 1 
Laws: 
( l l )  a I causes fl 
(12) a 2 causes  fl 
(13) a 2 causes  f2 
(14) a 3 causes  f2 if f l  
(15) a 4 causes f3 if f2 
Consider the statement f2 after a 4 at  s 1 denoted by H. It is easy to see that D 6 
has two models (~,E1)  and (~,  E2) where E l ( s l )=  [a l] and E2(s~)= [a 2] and 
therefore 
D 6 ~ (H  D a 2 occurs_at  So). 
Now, let D 7 =D 6 t J {H}. D 7 has two models, (XIt?, • 2) and ('kI't, •3) where •3(S1) = 
[a l ,  a3] and hence does not entail a 2 occurs_at  s 0. 
Technically, this somewhat unexpected property is easy to explain. In the former 
case H has no influence on construction of models of D 6 and only plays a role in 
21 They do point out that these assumptions can be weakened using abduction. 
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selecting models for which a 2 occurs_at s o must be evaluated. In the latter, 
instead, H is treated as a fact and influences the construction of the models of D 7. 
Intuitively, the explanation can be found in the unclear ontological status of 
having (2) in a domain description. Because of the semantic ambiguities and 
following the general principle of simplicity in language design, we decided not to 
allow (2) in domain descriptions of -Y1- 
APPENDIX B: LOGIC PROGRAMMING BACKGROUND 
Let a general ogic program is a collection of rules of the form 
l o *-- l 1 . . . . .  lm, not  l m + 1 , " ' ,  not ln, (1) 
where each l i is a ground atom. The expression on the left hand (right hand) side 
of ~ is called the head (resp. the body) of the rule. Both the head and the body of 
(1) can be empty. Intuitively the rule can be read as: if l 1 . . . . .  l m are believed and it 
is not true that lm+ 1 . . . . .  l n are believed then l 0 is believed. For a rule r of the for 
(1) the sets {10}, {l 1 . . . .  ,lm} and {lm + 1 . . . .  , ln} are referred to as head(r), pos(r)  and 
neg(r) respectively, lit(r) stands for head( r )Upos( r )Uneg( r ) .  For any general 
logic program If, head( i f )=  Ur~n head(r). For a set of predicates S, L i t (S)  
denotes the set of all ground literals with predicates from the language of 13. 
When it is clear from the context we write Lit instead of Lit(H).  
The answer set (stable model) of a general ogic program 13 without negation- 
as-failure is the smallest subset S of atoms such that for any rule l o ~ l~ . . . . .  l m 
from H, if l~ . . . . .  l m ~ S, then l 0 ~ S. The answer set of a program H that does not 
contain negation-as-failure is denoted by a( I I ) .  
Now let II be any general logic program. For any set S c Lit, let 11 s be the 
general ogic program obtained from H by deleting 
(i) each rule that has a formula not l in its body with l ~ S, and 
(ii) all formulae of the form not l in the bodies of the remaining rules. 
Clearly, I I s does not contain not, so that its answer set is already defined. If this 
answer set coincides with S, then we say that S is an answer set of H. In other 
words, the answer sets of II are characterized by the equation S = o~(HS). 
For a general program II and an atom f we say H ~f  iff f is true in all answer 
sets (stable models) of II. Similarly, we say II ~ ~ f iff f is false in all stable 
models of II. 
Lemma B.1 (Marek and Subrahmanian [MS89]). For any answer set S of  a general 
logic program H: 
(a) For any rule of  type 1 from H, if 
{ l  I . . . . .  Ira} cSand{ lm+ 1 . . . . .  l,} ns=Q 
then l o ~ S; 
( b ) I f  S is a consistent answer set o f  II and l o E S then there exists a rule of  the type 
1 from II such that 
{l 1 . . . . .  lm} gSand{ lm+ 1 . . . . .  l,} NS=O.  
We now review the definitions of splitting which is used in the proof of the 
lemmas. 
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Definition B.1 [LT94] (Splitting set). A spfitting set for a program H is any set U of 
literals such that, for every rule r ~ 11, if head(r) n U ~ @ then lit(r) c U. If  U 
is a splitting set for H, we also say that U splits P. The set of  rules r ~ II such 
that l i t ( r )c  U is called the bottom of H relative to the splitting set U and 
denoted by bv(I I ) .  The subprogram II \ bv( I I )  is called the top of I I  relative 
to U. 
Definition B.2 [LT94] (Partial evaluation). The partial evaluation of a program II 
with splitting set U w.r.t, a set of literals X is the program ev( I I ,  X )  defined as 
follows. For each rule r ~ II such that: 
(pos(r )  n U) cX  A (neg(r) n U) nX=• 
put in ev(H, X )  the rule r' which satisfies the following property: 
head(r') = head(r), pos(r') =pos(r) \ U, neg(r') = neg(r) \ U. 
Definition B.3 (Solution) [LT94]. Let U be a splitting set for a program II. A 
solution to II  w.r.t. U is a pair (X ,  Y)  of sets of literals such that: 
1. X is an answer set for bv( I I ) ;  
2. Y is an answer set for ev( I I  \ bu(I I ) ,  X )  and 
3. X u Y is consistent. 
Lemma B.2 [LT94] (Splitting lemma). Let U be a splitting set for a program H. A set 
A of literals is a consistent answer set for II if and only if A = X U Y for some 
solution ( X, Y ) to II w.r.t. U. 
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